2018年3月30日上午9：30-11：00 路海昊：公司管治披露政策的经济后果
讲座题目： Economic Consequences of Corporate Governance Disclosure: Evidence from the 2006 SEC Regulation on Related-Party Transactions
（公司管治披露政策的经济后果：来自证监会2006年关联方交易规定的证据）
主讲人：路海昊 加拿大滑铁卢大学会计与金融学院副教授
讲座时间：2018年3月30日（周五）上午9：30-11：00
讲座地点：阜成路西校区综合楼501
参加对象：我院会计系与财务系教师与研究生，全校对该专题感兴趣的师生
主讲人简介：加拿大滑铁卢大学会计与金融学院副教授，毕业于加拿大多伦多大学 (University of Toronto)会计学博士, 师从知名会计学家Ole-Kristian Hope。研究兴趣包括资本市场，银行信贷，信用评级，公司治理，关联交易等实证研究。曾在Journal of Business Finance and Accounting期刊发表学术论文，并担任Accounting Horizon、Journal of Corporate Finance和Contemporary Accounting Research期刊匿名审稿人。
主讲内容：
This paper examines the economic consequences of a 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation mandating public firms to disclose their governance policies on related-party transactions (hereafter RPTs). Employing hand-collected RPT data for S&P 1500 firms, I find that the initiation of RPT governance disclosure significantly reduces the occurrence of RPTs, suggesting an improvement in RPT governance. This reduction is more pronounced for firms with lower analyst coverage, weaker product-market competition, and lower institutional ownership. I also find that the disclosure effect is conditional on the types of RPTs and on the identities of the parties involved. Specifically, the disclosure effect concentrates on RPTs with the CEO, with the chairman of the board, and with directors, and on RPTs involving sales, leases, or loans, suggesting these transactions are more likely used for expropriation. Finally, I find that the disclosure of RPT governance reduces the implied costs of capital (ICC) associated with RPTs. I examine two possible mechanisms reducing the costs of capital and find that the governance channel is the main contributing factor over the information channel. My inferences are robust to the use of either the volume or amount of RPTs. Taken together, this study provides evidence about how disclosure on governance can enhance firms’ governance and about the real effects of the 2006 SEC’s regulation.